[AG-GOuFP] der (vorerst) verlorene Kampf um die Finanztransaktionssteuer

[moneymind <moneymind AT gmx.de>]

Schulmeister hat eine hervorragende Analyse des Streits um die 
Finanztransaktionssteuer seit 2008ff. veröffentlicht.

Ich stelle den Anfang mal hier rein (Hervorhebungen von mir), Link zum 
Rest am Ende:

*Abstract *

The struggle over the FTT has developed in three phases. In the first 
phase (2009 to 2011) the supporters of the tax went on the offensive, 
supported by the "shock effects" of the financial crisis. This phase ended 
with the (preliminary) "victory" in the form of the FTT proposal of the 
European Commission in September 2011. The second phase was shaped by the 
search for ways how to implement the FTT within the EU. It ended with the 
publication of a modified FTT proposal by the Commission in February 2013 
as basis for the implementation in 11 member countries. The last phase has 
been marked by a strong counter-offensive of the financial lobby which 
succeeded in playing off FTT supporting countries against each other, in 
particular Germany and France. This phase ended with a defeat of the FTT 
supporters.

Not even in a group of EU countries will a general FTT be implemented in 
the foreseeable future.

The struggle over the FTT was mainly carried out in two "battlefields", 
the intellectual disputes between economists at universities, research 
institutes and international organisations, and the political 
controversies between NGOs, political parties, governments and pressure 
groups, in particular the finance industry.
/
The conflict between recognition and interest, explanation and 
justification, analytical and normative thinking shapes the work of 
economists to a much larger extent than the work of any other types of 
intellectuals. The reason is given by Keynes at the end of his “General 
Theory”: “......the ideas of economists and political philosophers, 
both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than 
is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 383). /
*/
If economic theories “rule the world” then the distribution of power, 
income and wealth depends on which economic theory becomes a 
“paradigm”. This is so because economists then derive from this 
“Weltanschauung” the “navigation map” for policy. The thinking of 
economists is therefore driven by the interaction of three 
forces/motives/activities: Analysis and recognition of “true” 
relationships (science), justification of interests (ideology), and 
elaboration of concepts for “improving the world” (ethics). /*Any 
output of economists’ reasoning is a “mixture” resulting from the 
interaction of these three activities.

Even though one cannot exactly quantify the contribution of each of these 
activities (as they are closely interlinked), the following rule of thumb 
helps to gauge the importance of the ideological component of an economic 
theory or proposal: The higher is the degree of abstraction of their 
model, and the less its basic assumptions are derived from empirical 
research/experience, the more plausible is the suspicion that assumptions 
as well as methods were chosen to arrive at certain conclusions.

*/Classical economists, notably Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx, 
were well aware of the conflicting economic and political interests of 
different classes in society. As a consequence, they embedded their 
theories in the context of the interaction of these interests./* 
Conceiving themselves as members of the society, those economists took 
clear positions in favour of certain classes and against other classes. 
Their economics was devoted to analysing the “*political economy*” and 
to formulate proposals for its improvement - the idea of a 
“value-free” economic science would have seemed absurd to the classics.

Related to this understanding is their methodological approach: As they 
try to explain the most important economic developments like economic 
growth, specialization and trade, the distribution of income and wealth, 
the role of government in a market economy, etc., they try to base their 
assumptions on observations and to reach general conclusions carefully in 
an inductive way (taking into account the historical and regional context).

Even though the content of the - genuinely macroeconomic - theory of 
Keynes is very different from the – market-oriented - classical 
theories, Keynes shared the attitude of the classics in many respects: 
Also Keynes thought concretely and problem-oriented, based his reasoning 
rather on experience than on abstract models, and as a “political 
philosopher” he put his theory in the context of the conflict of 
interests of entrepreneurs, workers and(financial) rentiers. Last but not 
least, Keynes elaborated many concrete proposals for a better organization 
of the domestic and for the global economy. In complete contrast to this 
attitude, neoclassical economics, which has become the predominant school 
since the late 19th century, assumes that there exist “eternal truths” 
about the functioning of a capitalistic market economy. Economics is 
conceived as a value-free science, which aims at finding out these 
“economic laws” (they are assumed to be valid beyond time and space). 
*/Establishing economics as a value-free and, hence, nonideological 
science is itself the most important ideological component of the 
neoclassical school of thought. Such a self-image enables economists to 
“sell” their conclusions as objective truths and to repress the simple 
question: Which groups/classes are favoured or put at a disadvantage by 
the neoclassical “truths”. /*

The denial of the interaction between economic theory and economic reality 
calls for a specific methodological approach: One sets assumptions about 
the agents (“homo oeconomicus”), ideal market conditions, permanent 
market clearing, etc., all of which are not supported by the empirical 
evidence. Based on these assumptions, one constructs highly abstract 
models from which those results are (tauto)logically deducted which are 
already contained in the assumptions: All markets should be 
“liberalized”, governments should refrain from an active economic 
policy, irrespective whether it regards business cycle fluctuations, 
social security, income distribution or the regulations of the financial 
sector, etc. All these prescriptions favour certain groups in society over 
others. I term the first – classical and original Keynesian - approach 
to analysing economic relationships “realistic economics” (RE) and the 
neoclassical approach “idealistic economics” (IE). The key differences 
between both approaches concerns the way of thinking:

“Realistic economics” (RE) addresses concrete economic problems, 
collects empirical observations and tries to arrive at general conclusions 
about the relevant relationships in a predominantly – yet not 
exclusively – inductive manner. RE acknowledges the importance of 
contradictions in the economy,which should therefore be incorporated in 
economic theory. Policy recommendations are problem-oriented, pragmatic 
and, hence, embedded in the context of historical time. “Idealistic 
economics” (IE) aimsat modelling the universe of economic relationships 
in an ideal world – free of contradictions. To this end, IE has to make 
assumptions which “abstract away” essential properties of human beings 
and of their interaction in society like the role of emotions or of 
uncertainty.

> From the general equilibrium models based on these assumptions, one 
deducts a “navigation map” for economic policy – again valid beyond 
time and space. The two different approaches to economics do not only 
shape the activities of economists at the academic level, but also 
economic policy. E. g., the New Deal of Roosevelt or the full employment 
policy of the 1950s and 1960s are typical examples of the RE approach, 
strict rules for monetary and fiscal policy like the fiscal compact of the 
EU or deregulation as a general guideline are typical for the IE approach. 
The sequence of prosperity and depressions is interconnected with the 
sequence of RE and IE paradigms. One specific reason for that lies in the 
influence of economic paradigms on the incentive conditions of the overall 
system. IE paradigms favour deregulation in general and of financial 
markets in particular so that striving for profits shifts gradually from 
the real to the financial economy. The “production” of “fictitious 
capital” (Karl Marx) in the form of overvalued assets, in particular the 
government debt, leads inevitably into a deep crisis. After a long lasting 
learning period (the bottom phase of the “long cycle”), an RE paradigm 
leads to changes in the incentive structure and in economic policy: 
Striving for profits is again focused on activities in the real economy, 
leading to prosperity. The long cycle since the 1920s is a good example 
for this interaction: The finance-capitalistic framework conditions and 
the related stock market boom led to the crash of 1929, the subsequent 
recession was transformed into a depression due to the austerity policy 
prescribed by the IE paradigm. The learning from the crisis, in particular 
in the form of a new RE theory provided by Keynes, laid the ground for the 
real-capitalistic system of the 1950s and 1960s. Since then, the 
restoration of the neoclassic paradigm, completed by the most unrealistic 
assumptions ever made in the history of economic thought (rational 
expectations, financial market efficiency, real business cycle, etc.), 
served as the scientific legitimation of the interest of finance capital 
in a complete deregulation of asset markets. The related change in the 
incentive conditions paved the long way into the current crisis.

At present, the European economy is in a state of depression (external 
demand is the only growth component), typical for the bottom phase of the 
long cycle: The IE recipes continue to weaken domestic demand, yet, the 
elites re main stuck in the neoliberal paradigm which has been dominating 
longer than ever before.

In such a situation where a new RE paradigm is not in sight, single RE 
proposals are put forward which could/should change the course of events 
(e. g., the Glass-Steagall act of 1933 to restrict - as Roosevelt put it 
– “speculation with other people’s money”). In the present 
situation in Europe, the proposal of a general Financial Transactions Tax 
(FTT) has become the most important proposal of this kind.

The struggle over the usefulness of a FTT on the academic level, in the 
media and in politics, between EU member states as well as within each 
country, reflects the fundamental differences between the “realistic” 
and “idealistic” approach to economics. /As the crisis deepens, this 
struggle will extend to other problem fields like unemployment or the 
public debt. These struggles are part of the process of destructing the 
old paradigm and developing a new one (in part by trying new ways in 
practice as done by the New Deal). Such a process is most typical for the 
trough phase of the “long cycle”. /

In this essay I shall elaborate upon the most important arguments/weapons 
of the proponents of and the opponents to a FTT. I’ll try to show that 
the argument of the proponents are typical for RE reasoning, whereas the 
arguments of opponents are derived from the “idealistic” economic 
paradigm. I shall further document how the arguments against a FTT, 
derived from extremely abstract axioms, legitimate the extremely concrete 
interests of banks and hedge funds which have been specializing in 
“finance alchemy” for so long.

Weiter im Text:
http://www.wifo.ac.at/jart/prj3/wifo/resources/person_dokument/person_dokument.jart?publikationsid=47272&mime_type=application/pdf